INTRODUCTION
By Larry Robbins
In his speech at the opening of Parliament on 28 June 1934 the Governor General said [1]:
“The existing charts of the New Zealand coast have been found to be insufficiently complete to meet the full requirements of ocean transport, and ships are frequently delayed owing to difficulty in determining their exact position under conditions of low visibility. Navigation instruments are now obtainable, by the aid of which these delays could be obviated, if the coastline and neighbouring seabed were fully and accurately charted. My Ministers have been in communication with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and have been informed that a suitable surveying ship will be available to undertake this work in 1936, when it is contemplated that the question of providing the necessary funds will be brought before Parliament…”
The cost to the New Zealand government for such survey work was to be relatively little, one minute indeed noting that the terms were ‘extremely favourable’. The Admiralty had simply enquired whether the NZ government would be willing to ‘make contributions in aid of the work’ such as coal, docking and refit costs and the provision of shore facilities to draw up the surveys during winter. The implication – and what actually occurred – was that the ‘Imperial Government’ would supply the ship and bear the expenses connected with the pay, victualling, and the cost of all other routine stores.
Not unsurprisingly, the New Zealand government readily accepted the arrangement and undertook to fund the estimated £18,000 per annum required. As the coaling, docking and refitting of the ship was expected to result in increased employment in New Zealand, the Unemployment Board agreed to contribute one third of the annual costs (£16,500) for all but the office accommodation.
The ship sent by the Admiralty to undertake the work was HMS ENDEAVOUR. She arrived in Auckland in June 1937[2] under the command of Captain A G N Wyatt RN and was soon engaged on the coastal survey. ENDEAVOUR’s survey was destined to be cut short and almost two years to the day after commencing work, in July 1939 she received orders to proceed to her war station, Singapore where, according to J O’C Ross in This Stern Coast[3] she ‘was paid off and never saw service again.’
Some localised hydrographic work was conducted during the war from small naval vessels but there was no concerted progress on the coastal survey.
Early in 1946 the Naval Secretary wrote[4] to the Secretary of the Marine Department inquiring whether the Marine Department proposed ‘to make arrangements for continuing the survey of the coastline’. He also asked whether the Admiralty should be approached to make HMS ENDEAVOUR or another similar vessel available as it had before the war – and on the same conditions.
With Cabinet approval the request was passed to the Admiralty a few months later. In February 1947 the Naval Secretary on-forwarded the response[5]:
“… the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty advise that the effect of the war on the Royal Navy and the heavy arrears of surveying in waters nearer the more immediate strategic areas render it impossible for the Royal Navy to take up again, for a number of years, the much needed New Zealand survey, which had to stop on the outbreak of war … The Lordships are of the opinion that the most satisfactory solution would be for the Government of New Zealand to construct a surveying ship and to carry out the survey as one of the activities of the Royal New Zealand Navy …”
The Lordships offered to provide Royal Navy specialists as the Captain and First Lieutenant of such a ship and offered to lend or sell outright a ‘suitable vessel’, offering to prepare an estimates of costs for such a project. It was suggested that junior New Zealand officers could be trained in RN survey ships whilst any vessel was building or converting. Whilst various options were explored – a portent of an exercise to be repeated a little less than 20 years later – no suitable ship was available in New Zealand although the government steam ship MATAI was considered for a while.
Ultimately, a River Class frigate, HMAS LACHLAN – built in Sydney in 1944 – was loaned to the RNZN by the Royal Australian Navy for a three-year period whilst the RNZN would build their own ship in the UK. HMNZS LACHLAN commissioned into the RNZN on 5 October 1949 under the command of Commander J M Sharpey-Schafer RN who had served in ENDEAVOUR during her New Zealand survey. With this assistance from two generous fraternal organisations, the Hydrographic Surveying Service of the Royal New Zealand Navy was born.
The terms under which LACHLAN had been obtained were extremely advantageous to the RNZN and, not unsurprisingly, moves to have a new ship built were allowed to atrophy. The loan of HMNZS LACHLAN was to be extended at various times until she was purchased outright by the RNZN in 1962 at her assessed scrap value of $32,000.
The River Class frigates were built with a planned life of 20 years and the need to replace LACHLAN was raised at various times. Formal approval to pursue a replacement was received from the New Zealand Naval Board in 1960[6] and the derivation of a ‘staff target’ was commenced. The Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy had both recently issued Staff Targets for new hydrographic/oceanographic ships and their requirements were to be closely studied by the Naval Staff experts in Wellington over the next few years.
Various avenues were explored and the files are full of various comments and opinions over the first few years of the 1960’s although little positive progress was made. The Canadian ‘Type 171’ oceanographic ship was investigated and the United States Navy was approached about the possibility of procuring a vessel from the ‘Mothball Fleet’ although, probably fortunately, there was no suitable vessel available. The search was complicated somewhat because as well as building the four vessels of the HECLA class, the Royal Navy were procuring a smaller coastal survey vessel (the FAWN class) and the greatly reduced individual cost of these ships was an attractive possibility for some time.
The Hydrographer RNZN, Commander W J L SMITH RNZN, was apparently active in discussing the needs of New Zealand with his contemporaries at the International Hydrographic Conference in Monaco in 1967 and Captain D HASLAM RN, the Australian Hydrographer, provided information about HMAS MORESBY and compared her (unfavourably) to HECLA. Hydrography has always been a field in which information is freely exchanged. The informal evaluation process clearly indicated that the cooperation extended well beyond the exchange of bathymetric data.
By 1967, the search for LACHLAN’s replacement had, in the Naval Staff, narrowed to either a ship of the HECLA type or two coastal vessels of the FAWN type. Australian, Canadian, Japanese or US vessels recently procured by the hydrographic organisations of those countries had been examined but either of the preferred options would, it appeared, be considerably less expensive than a new building from those countries’ yards. In a meeting in September that year it was accepted that LACHLAN would reach the end of her useful life in 1971 and the merits of having two of the smaller vessels as against one larger ship were debated at length. In response to the possibility of procuring the smaller ships, the Hydrographer is recorded as stating ‘the UK Hydrographer, Rear Admiral Ritchie, was horrified at this idea and [said] that ships like this were unsuitable for the New Zealand coast and that a stable platform was a requirement for survey work.’
Rear Admiral G S Ritchie CB DSC, was a contemporary of the senior officers of the RNZN of that time and had served in command of HMNZS LACHLAN and as Hydrographer RNZN in the mid 1950’s. He had extensive surveying experience in various theatres and a good knowledge of the requirements of this exposed part of the world. The Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral J O’C Ross CB CBE, did not, however, take the reported statement at face value. He directed[7] further studies into the operational advantages and constraints of two smaller survey ships and required a detailed reasoning for preferring a HECLA (including the costs involved) to be set out in order to make the navy’s case.
The Chief of Naval Staff then wrote personally to Admiral Ritchie formally seeking his advice over the conundrum.
It would seem that Commander Smith might have rather over-stated Admiral Ritchie’s views, for his lengthy and detailed response[8] failed to provide definitive guidance. However, the admiral’s letter did provide a detailed comparison of the vessels and their capabilities. More importantly he pointed out some problems being experienced with the HECLA class during their initial service, including the matter of their low speed as the ships had been designed to include a considerable oceanographic function and they were thus capable of steaming for long periods of at slow speed but at the expense of cruising speed. Admiral Ritchie also mentioned the liveliness of the ships in a seaway. Passive stabilisers had, he said, subsequently been fitted in HMS HYDRA and this had apparently controlled their roll, but the pitch was ‘still considerable and chartroom work at sea … far more difficult than in a ship with a wartime frigate hull.’
The quoted costs[9] of a standard HECLA and the costs for two vessels of the FAWN class proved, at marginally over £2 million for the former, to be very similar and FAWN soon dropped from the equation. The deficiencies of HECLA that the British had highlighted and which the RNZN’s hydrographic officers had surmised and deduced, however, proved worrisome to the RNZN authorities. Investigations continued, though the delays were obviously frustrating to the Hydrographer who penned a terse note in January 1968[10] stating ‘When I asked for a HECLA in 1964 it could have been acquired for less than £1 million. The price we pay for procrastination is £1 million ie 100% in 3 years.’ Concerns that the HECLA hull would be too short for New Zealand conditions were prescient for it was later discovered through informal means that the original HECLA design had been modified to reduce the length by 30 feet and thus the cost.[11] [12].
Some consternation was felt in naval circles when a letter sent from the Minister of Defence to the Minister of Marine in March 1969[13] made the case for a replacement ship but in discussing the financing of such a vessel included the statement that there was little direct benefit to Defence from hydrography in peacetime. This phrase caused a flurry of minutes within Naval Staff who firmly contested this view and re-affirmed the intention to retain and nurture a Hydrographic Service. The matter was, however, allowed to rest as the statement was deemed to be primarily a ploy over the financing of the ship. The importance of the proposal ‘in the national interest’ was accepted by the Minister of Marine[14] and various inter-departmental discussions – but little apparent progress – ensued.
The ongoing delays in settling upon a replacement for HMNZS LACHLAN were of concern to others outside the navy and the NZ Shipping Federation and the New Zealand European Shipping Association amongst a host of others urged action. Several approaches mentioned discussions at conferences of Harbour Boards and the like and one surmises that there may have been a degree of lobbying by the Hydrographer in such fora. The NZESA noted ‘the very valuable service already performed [by the Hydrographic Service]’[15] and urged ‘expediency in the provision of a replacement vessel to enable this important work to continue.’ It would appear, though, that not a lot has changed in the function of government over the years for the matter of LACHLAN’s replacement continued to bounce around Wellington for a considerable time with the Treasury posing various questions again about various alternatives including chartering a ship, contracting the RAN Hydrographic Service to do the work and obtaining a vessel from the US mothball fleet.
In 1969, the Australian arm of a Scottish company, Y-ARD Ltd (Yarrow – Admiralty Research Division, a subsidiary of Yarrows who had built the HECLA class ships) had been engaged by the RNZN to investigate proposed patrol craft for the RNZN. At meetings in Wellington they had heard of the proposal to purchase a survey ship such as HECLA and, hearing of the concerns over the performance of these vessels, offered ‘at no cost’ to undertake preliminary investigations into a modified HECLA design in accordance with a schedule proposed by the Assistant Hydrographer, Lieutenant Commander G B W Johnson RNZN. At about the same time the Naval Board received an offer from the builders of the HECLA class, Yarrow (Shipbuilders) Ltd to build a ship incorporating the modifications being incorporated into one of the class ordered for the South African Navy (SAS PROTEA). The cost savings due to scale were pointed out and the ship was offered at a cost of £2.62 million (approximately $5.3 million) with a delivery date in early 1972.
The Yarrow offer was not pursued because enquiries showed that the South African modifications mainly consisted of amendments to the propulsion system – which did not fully overcome the limitations of her cruising speed – and changes to the accommodation to reflect the South African apartheid system. This latter, various officers suggested, may be somewhat inappropriate in a New Zealand ship.
Early in 1970 the Y-ARD proposals for the NZ modified HECLA were received and it was noted that they met most of the New Zealand requirement. The preliminary Y-ARD design lowered the superstructure by one deck increased the hull length slightly and reduced the beam by almost a metre with a consequent re-arrangement of internal spaces and a promised improvement in sea-keeping ability. The RNZN’s requirements in cruising speed were not met although the ship’s top speed was increased. The outline drawing is of a very trim vessel similar in many ways to the outward appearance of the pre-war HMS ENDEAVOUR. The cost of what was essentially a new ship was quoted as being $7.5 million. Approval was sought by the Naval Staff to proceed with a deep feasibility study into the design. This was subsequently approved[16] at a cost of $35,000 and then became referred to under the contract designation Y-2006.
The Hydrographer RNZN (now Commander I.S.Monro RNZN) was appointed as the project officer. Commander Monro had commanded LACHLAN and had a very good idea of what was required in a new ship following extensive experience on the New Zealand coast. He soon produced the Staff Requirement for the new ship incorporating most of his predecessor’s ideas over the ship’s capabilities and the equipment to be fitted, including the radical (for the day) requirement that an automated data logging (ie computer) system should be installed in the ship from new. He also started a dedicated and protracted push to have a light helicopter procured for the ship. This, though, was ultimately to come to naught apart from the provision of hangar and flight deck facilities in the new ship.
Y-ARD presented their Deep Feasibility Report to a meeting in Naval Staff at the end of March 1971[17] and to a meeting of senior departmental officers three weeks later.[18] After considerable effort and discussion in Naval Staff, the RNZN formally proposed to government that a further contract – based upon the earlier study and now designated Y-2046 – should be let to the company at the start of 1972[19]. This contract would be for Y-ARD to produce the specifications and guidance drawings and arrange tank testing for the new ship and the package would form part of any ‘invitations to tender’. This contract was expected to be completed in a little under 6 months at a cost of ‘up to $82,250’[20]. The draft contract had the stated aim of introducing the new ship into service by the end of 1974[21] at an estimated cost of $10.5 million[22].
The continued delay in making a decision on a replacement survey ship was again noted as being of concern by a number of outside agencies. Rear Admiral J O’ C Ross, now the Administrator of the Exports and Shipping Council, was moved to write to the Minister of Defence in January 1972[23]. Pointing out that whilst he had ‘strictly avoided becoming involved in defence matters’ since leaving the Naval service, the ‘broader maritime interests’ and some reported remarks by the minister had caused him to now express his concerns over the further delays in replacing LACHLAN. Admiral Ross noted a number of important national projects planned on the NZ coast[24] and being implemented and concluded:
“ … I seriously believe it to be a false economy to prejudice the coastal survey, upon which depends the safe passage of much of the country’s export trade.
While strongly affirming that the professional task of surveying is best reposed in the Naval Service, I feel bound to point out that any question of its slowing down or temporary abandonment would be a matter for serious concern by many interested parties outside the Defence field.”
The navy’s proposal to enter into the Y-2046 contract was finally considered at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence on 28 January 1972 and it is at this meeting that the first mention of the MOANA ROA as a possible replacement was formally raised[25]:
“The point was made that it appeared that the Moana Roa might not be required for the Cook Islands’ service for very much longer. Officials were asked whether this ship would be suited to conversion as a survey ship. The comment was made that the Moana Roa could meet several of the criteria but not that of speed. It was also doubted whether she would have the ability to carry heavy survey equipment without a lot of ballast. A conclusion could be reached only after a detailed study of the question including the cost-effectiveness of the conversion of the ship. It was noted that the Moana Roa could continue in service for about 20 years. The work on refitting her as a survey ship may have to be done outside New Zealand. It was the view of the Committee that a study of the overall suitability of the Moana Roa for conversion as a survey ship should be undertaken by Defence and Marine without delay.”
A decision on the proposal to fund the Y2046 contract was deferred and the Defence and Marine Departments were instructed to undertake the study ‘without delay.’
Robert (later Sir Robert) Muldoon, the Minister of Finance, (CHECK THIS) had presaged this event in notes and general enquiries sent to Naval Staff [26] and thus there was some forewarning. The Hydrographer, Commander Ian Monro RNZN, later recalled
The RNZN was galvanised into action and following review of the ship’s plans and an initial visit to the ship, a preliminary report was made to the Chief of Naval Staff within 3 weeks. A formal initial report was then forwarded to the Secretary of Defence in the middle of March 1972. The report showed considerable similarity between MOANA ROA and Y-2046 but noted that she was ‘tatterdemalion’[27] in appearance and lacking in upperdeck maintenance. Proposals, caveats and some doubts expressed bear a striking resemblance of what was to be discovered and effected in the conversion she was subsequently to undergo and one has to express certain admiration for Commander Wildy and Mr Bell[28] in respect of the quality of the report rendered in such a short period of time.
Moana Roa was a twin screw motor vessel of around 4000 tons deep displacement. She was built on the East Coast of Scotland by the Grangemouth Dockyard Company Ltd as yard number 526, and completed in 1960. The ship had been designed by Sir J.H.Biles and Co for the New Zealand Government Department of Island Affairs to carry around 2000 tons of cargo and 40 passengers between New Zealand and the Cook Islands. She had been a popular and well-known vessel on this run, and she is still remembered with affection in the Cook Islands. The development of an airport at Rarotonga and the construction of a small port at Avatiu – which she was too large to enter – had, however, rendered her redundant after almost twelve years of service.
In a splendid example of inter-departmental cooperation which we may largely have lost in this day and age, the Department of Island Affairs arranged to bring the ship’s 12-year survey forward by several months at their cost in order that a fuller assessment of her condition might be made. Commander Monro accompanied by the Commanding Officer of HMNZS LACHLAN, Commander I.W.Munro RNZN, another surveying officer and various technical officers also went out with the ship for trials. The Master of MOANA ROA, Captain Alex Fraser, was most accommodating and allowed the naval officers to put the ship through her paces.
The Naval Dockyard at Devonport in Auckland estimated that the conversion could be completed in 15 months at a total cost of a little under $2 million at April 1972 rates although overheads would put the true cost closer to $3 million. The estimate included labour costs of $604637 (364240 hours at $1.66 per hour) or 9025 man-weeks. The Captain Superintendent’s report,[29] however, expressed severe reservations about the state of the ship’s engines and warned that the full costs could only be ascertained once the ship was taken in hand. The antiquated electrical distribution system (which one assessment described as being ‘built down to a cost and not up to a standard’ and with generators which were obsolete on installation having been based on a 1930’s design) was also stated to be a matter for concern but did not affect the viability of the conversion.
This estimate was rejected as being overly optimistic and a minute to the Secretary of Defence at the end of August 1972[30] gave an estimate ‘in very general terms’ of $5 million and stated that the conversion was beyond the ability of the Dockyard to undertake. Two consultancy firms[31] were contacted to provide quotations for feasibility studies into modifications to the propulsion machinery to make the ship more suitable for the survey role and for the provision of a detailed design study if engine modifications did indeed seem feasible.
The most favourable quotation was that of Burness Corlett and Partners Ltd at $32,400 for the former study and about $61,700 for the second, and the company was given the go-ahead in January 1973[32].
Further sea trials were conducted by a naval team on MOANA ROA in the Hauraki Gulf on 27 January 1973 to provide deceleration data requested by the consultants. Commander Monro subsequently advised keeping a cautious eye on the material state of the vessel advising that the master held ‘strong opinions’ about her condition and felt that there was far more wasting than was generally evident. The Deputy Chief of Naval Staff noted: ‘[he hoped that] this was not a prophesy [sic] of gloom. H could well be right.’
The Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral E C Thorne, forwarded the results of the feasibility study to the Defence Council in July 1973 [33]. The Defence Council met on 30 August 1973 and whilst it noted that ‘considered in isolation, it would be better to replace HMNZS LACHLAN with a new ship’ the availability of MOANA ROA made the proposal to convert her ‘an eminently sensible one.’ The conversion, at an estimated cost of $5.324 million, was thus recommended to Cabinet. Whilst a survey of NZ shipbuilders was recommended, Treasury did not support the cost of $6950 and proposed that tenders be called worldwide. The conversion was supported by the Ministry of Transport whilst the Ministry of Maori and Island Affairs supported the transfer of the ship to the Ministry of Defence, asking only that any announcement be delayed until the Premier of the Cook Islands and NZ Shipping Unions could be advised. The Ministers of Defence and Transport both indicated their willingness to have the cost of the project paid from their vote, but each indicated that additional funding would need to be included in their vote to cover the cost.
Cabinet, in a meeting on 5 February 1974 finally approved the conversion and made additional provision to the Defence vote to meet the ‘full capital costs.[34]’
The Government Motor Vessel MOANA ROA was finally handed over to the Royal New Zealand Navy on 15 August 1974 and was renamed MONOWAI after the armed merchant cruiser which served in the RNZN during World War 2
HMNZS LACHLAN was decommissioned in January 1975, almost 34 years after she was built.
[1] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 1
[2] This Stern Coast page 186
[3] This Stern Coast – The story of the Charting of the New Zealand Coast – J O’C ROSS, published by A H & A W REED 1969
[4] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 1
[5] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 1
[6] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 2
[7] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 2. Minutes of Ship Replacement Programme meeting 18 September 1967.
[8]NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 3. H(W) 1154/67 dated 27 November 1967.
[9] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 4. N/F3/2421/67 dated 18 January 1968. $4.422 million for HECLA and $4.268 million for the two FAWNs
[10] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1. Minute referenced to DL 011/1/14 dated 22 January 1968. H note 30/1/68.
[11] Ian Monro. Discussion with Admiral ………………………. (Hydrographer of the Navy).
[12] Coincidentally the RNZN were looking at patrol craft around the same time and were to make the same mistake in bowing to government pressure to reduce the size of the vessels purchased in order to obtain four shorter vessels rather than three craft of the original length
[13] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1 Tag 5. ‘HYDROGRAPHIC SERVICE’ letter from Minister of Defence to Minister of Marine 17 March 1969 (quoted as 19 March in response).
[14] W.J.SCOTT
[15] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1. NZESA letter 10 October 1969
[16] NA 074/3/15 Vol 1. Def 41/4/1 15 July 1970
[17] NA 074/3/15 Vol 2. Minutes by Captain Bland 23 March 1971 and 31 March 1971. Copied to 74/3/18.
[18] NA 074/3/15 Vol 2. Minute to Sec Def by RADM CARR 7 April 1971.
[19] NA 074/3/15 Vol 2. CM 71/50/46 cabinet meeting 21 December 1971 referred to Cabinet Defence Committee meeting 28 January 1972.
[20] NA 074/3/15 Vol 2. Y-ARD letter 23 April 1971. Price quoted as $A63,000. Later amended. Forwarded to Minister of Defence 26 August 1971.
[21] NA 074/3/15 Vol 2. Y-ARD letter 23 April 1971. Appendix 1.
[22] NA 074/3/15 Vol 2. At March 1971 prices. Y-ARD letter 20 May 1971.
[23] NA 074/3/15 Vol 3. Exports and Shipping Council letter 25 January 1972.
[24] Marsden Point refinery etc
[25] NA 074/3/15 Vol 3. Minutes of Cabinet Committee
[26] Ian Monro – personal recollection
[27] Ragamuffin, unkempt. This was translated to ‘shabby’ in the report that went to the Cabinet Committee.
[28] Commander E.A.Wildy RNZN, Director of Marine Engineering and Mr J.A.( Sandy) Bell, Director of Naval Construction.
[29] NA 074/3/15 Vol 3. NB 0140/71/1 dated 12 May 1972.
[30] NA 074/3/15 Vol 3 Minute from CNS to Sec Def dated 29 August 1972
[31] NA 074/3/15 Vol 4 Letter dated 11 Oct 1972 Burness Corlett & Partners Ltd and Y-ARD (Australia) Ltd
[32] NA 074/3/15 Vol 4 Letter dated 12 Jan 1973
[33] NA 074/3/15 Vol 5 NA 74/3/19 dated 10 July 1973. Annex C to DO(73)38 dated 22 August 1973
[34] NA 074/3/15 Vol 5
[35] 10 October 1979
[36] Report of Proceeding December 1979 MW142/2 dated 31 January 1980
[37] a broadcast is a communications system utilising loudspeakers. The ‘Main broadcast’ can be heard throughout the ship, ‘machinery broadcasts’ can be heard in the machinery spaces.